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In my dissertation I have been concerned with the existence of multiple 
models of the same phenomenon. A common explanation for this 
multiplicity is that different models serve different virtues, so the 
multiplicity disappears once the virtues that are required for a given 
purpose are made explicit (the consensual view) and the existence of 
multiple models does not undermine the possibility of a single standard 
for scientific assessment. I indicate two complications for this view, 
respectively demonstrating that this view is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for analysing all scientific controversies.  
The first controversy is drawn from economics: neoclassical 
economics’ a priori preference for generality, regardless of the purpose 
at hand. The second concerns a debate in history, the Historikerstreit, 
from which I drew the conclusion that if the political views and personal 
interests of scientists coincide with the different sides in a debate, then 
the question of what virtues should be served by a model is no longer 
given, but becomes an integral part of the debate.  
The shortcomings of the consensual view (Rawls, Giere) in providing 
adequate guidance in dealing with multiple models have led me to the 
literature on pluralism in philosophy of science and political science. 
From that literature, I distilled two additional views on the interplay 
between different models, an agonist (Mouffe, Rescher) and an 
antagonist (Kuhn, Lawson) view. In contrast to consensualism, both 
views hold that multiplicity will not eventually disappear: multiple 
standards for scientific assessment remain possible at all times. As a 
consequence, the dynamics of such a scientific community has a 
complexity not captured in traditional (consensualist) models of the 
distribution of labour in science.  
On the consensual view a scientific community will tend toward 
consensus, which is a single, optimal equilibrium. In order to find       
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out what the dynamics of a community under multiple standards for 
scientific assessments would look like, I teamed up with Matthias Greiff, 
a German economist specialising in network economics. We developed a 
model describing the dynamics of standards competing for adoption, in 
analogy to the models used to describe the dynamics of technological 
standards competing for adoption which were used during the Microsoft 
antitrust trial. In our model, the consensual model is retained as a 
special case. Our main finding was that the insights derived from 
consensual models (single standard models) are not robust against an 
increase in the number of standards. Most importantly, such systems 
boast multiple equilibria which are not necessarily optimal. 
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